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We study quantum communication in the presence of adversarial noise. In this setting, communi-
cating with perfect fidelity requires using a quantum code of bounded minimum distance, for which
the best known rates are given by the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov (QGV) bound. By asking only
for arbitrarily high fidelity and allowing the sender and reciever to use a secret key with length
logarithmic in the number of qubits sent, we achieve a dramatic improvement over the QGV rates.
In fact, we find protocols that achieve arbitrarily high fidelity at noise levels for which perfect fidelity
is impossible. To achieve such communication rates, we introduce fully quantum list codes, which
may be of independent interest.
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INTRODUCTION
Effectively dealing with noise is a major challenge faced
by all proposals for the coherent manipulation of quan-
tum information. In addition to quantum communica-
tion, sending a quantum state over a noisy channel mod-
els noisy storage, and as such, characterizing communi-
cation rates over quantum channels is a central question
in the study of both quantum information and computa-
tion.
Various asymptotic capacities of quantum channels have
been studied [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. How-
ever, this work has been almost exclusively concerned
with discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), wherein a
sender and receiver use many independent and identi-
cal copies of a channel. In this scenario, one studies the
asymptotic communication rate possible using an oper-
ation of the form N⊗n, where N is the channel under
consideration and its rate is given by R = k/n where k is
the number of high fidelity logical qubits sent. Relatively
little is known outside of the DMC scenario, with notable
exceptions found in [12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
In this paper, we study communication over an adver-
sarial quantum channel (AC), which is perhaps as differ-
ent from a DMC as one can imagine. When sending n
qubits over an AC, rather than errors on different qubits
occuring independently, an adversary who knows what
protocol is being used tries to foil the communication by
maliciously choosing a superposition of errors, subject
only to a restriction on the number of qubits each error
affects. We will call this channel N advp,n , where p is the
fraction of the n qubits that the adversary is permitted
to corrupt. N advp,n is the natural quantum generalization
of the classical adversarial channel that was considered
in [17, 18] and whose roots go back to [19].
If the receiver is required to reconstruct the logical
state exactly, communicating over N advp,n requires using
a quantum error correcting code (QECC) of distance
2⌈np⌉+1. The quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound guar-
antees the existence of such a code with a rate of at least
1−H(2p)−2p log 3 [20], where logarithms are taken base 2
here and throughout the paper. Communication beyond
this rate is possible only if QECCs beating the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound exist, which is a question that has been
quite difficult to resolve. Furthermore, Rains has shown
that there are no quantum codes with distance greater
than n/3 [21], so that it is impossible to send even a
single qubit for p ≥ 1/6.
Surprisingly, if we ask only for a high fidelity recon-
struction, and allow the sender and receiver to share
a secret key of size O(log n) it is possible to communi-
cate at rates much higher than the Gilbert-Varshamov
and Rains bounds suggest. Below, we present a cod-
ing strategy for this scenario which achieves a rate of
1 −H(p) − p log 3, which is significantly larger than the
Gilbert-Varshamov rate for all values of p and remains
nonzero up to p ≈ 0.189.
There are 3 ingredients in achieving such rates with neg-
ligible secret keys. We employ two coding techniques.
The first ingredient is a pre-determined quantum list code
that is known to the adversary. This alone allows high-
rate but low-fidelity transmission. To improve on the
fidelity, a random subcode is further chosen according
to a secret key unknown to the adversary. Finally, the
subcode is derandomized by using ǫ-biased sets.
Informally, a quantum list code is an error correcting
code with the relaxed reconstruction requirement that
the decoded state be equal to the original state acted
on by a superposition of a small number of errors. The
number of errors is called the “list length.” This relax-
ation allows a considerable increase in rate compared to
QECCs, and by using a standard probabilistic argument
we show there are list codes with constant-length lists and
rate approaching 1−H(p)−p log 3 which tolerate pn er-
2rors. Then, by using O(log n) bits of secret key to choose
a pseudorandom, large subcode of the list code, the re-
ceiver is able to distinguish between the various errors in
the list and communicate with high fidelity at the rate of
the list code being used.
Note that a single level of random code could also be
used, but the secret key required would be O(n2) bits.
One could also achieve a rate of 1−H(p)−p log 3 by using
secret key to determine a permutation of the n channel
uses (see, e.g., [22] or [15]), at a cost of O(n log n) bits
which, unfortunately, also leads to a divergent secret key
rate. We further note that key recycling as a technique
to lower the amortized cost cannot be used in a straigh-
forward manner in our adversarial scenario. In a sense,
our list-code construction can be viewed as a derandom-
ization these key-inefficient protocols, achieving the same
result with a much shorter secret key.
After the initial presentation of this result [23], we leant
of two independent studies of list codes, both in settings
quite different from our own. Reference [24] studied de-
coding of classical list codes using quantum algorithms,
and Ref. [25] studied list codes for sending classical mes-
sages via iid quantum channels.
In the next section we review some basic background ma-
terial, then present the details of our construction after
which we discuss an application to entanglement distilla-
tion from states with adversarial errors, as well as a few
open problems.
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
Throughout, our sender, receiver, and adversary will be
named Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The encoding
of a k-qubit state |ψ〉 into an error correcting code will
be written as |ψ¯〉. We call the Pauli group acting on n
qubits Gn and write its elements in the form P = itXuZv,
where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u,v are binary vectors of length











. The (anti)commutation re-
lation between P1, P2 ∈ Gn is determined by P1P2 =
(−1)ω(P1,P2)P2P1 with ω(P1, P2) = u1 ·v2+u2 ·v1, where
the dot products and sum are computed in arithmetic
modulo two. We let 〈Pl〉 denote the subgroup of Gn gen-
erated by a set of Pauli elements {Pl}.
A state |ψ〉 is said to be stabilized by a Pauli matrix
P when P |ψ〉 = |ψ〉. An [n, k] stabilizer code is a 2k-
dimensional space of n-qubit states simultaneously sta-
bilized by all elements of a size 2n−k abelian subgroup
of Gn. The abelian subgroup is typically called S and is
referred to as the code’s stabilizer, and has n−k gener-
ators denoted by {Si}
n−k
i=1 . For any E ∈ Gn we refer to
the (n−k)-bit string ω(E,Si) as the syndrome of E (see,
e.g., [20, 26]). The weight of a Pauli matrix P , which
we denote by wt(P ), is the number of qubits on which P
acts nontrivially, and we call a stabilizer code an [n, k, d]
code if it can detect all errors of weight less than the dis-
tance d, which is equivalent to being able to correct all
errors of weight less than ⌊(d−1)/2⌋. For any real num-
ber r, let Er be the set of all Pauli matrices of weight
no larger than ⌊r⌋. Let N(S) be the set of all unitaries
which leave S invariant under conjugation. Then, S de-
fines an [n, k, d] code if and only if for every pair of errors
Ei, Ej ∈ E(d−1)/2 we have E
†
iEj 6∈ N(S)− S.
We now define the channel we wish to study.
Definition 1 The n-qubit adversarial quantum channel
with error rate p, which we call N advp,n , acts on a state of
n qubits, ρ, and is of the form













iAi = I and where
Enp = {E ∈Gn |wt(E)≤ pn} is as defined before. The
particular choice of the {Ai}’s is made by Eve only after
Alice and Bob have decided on a communication strategy.
In particular, notice that to communicate effectively over
N advp,n one must find a strategy that works with high fi-
delity for all channels described by Eq. (1). To do this,
we will use quantum list codes, which are defined below.
QUANTUM LIST CODES
Definition 2 We say that an [n, k] stabilizer code, C, is
an [n, k, t, L]-list code if there is a decoding operation,
D, such that for every Ei ∈ Et and |ψ¯〉 ∈ C, the de-
















j = I, and each A
s
j is a linear combination of






l=1 is a list of
logical errors on the codespace and 〈P sl 〉
L
l=1 is the group
they generate.
We now show that, asymptotically, there exist [n, k, t, L]-
list codes with favorable parameters. We proceed by con-
sidering random stabilizer codes, arguing along the lines
of [20, 27]. In particular, we’ll show that if we choose a
random stabilizer code with rate as below, in the limit of
large n the probability of it failing to be L-list decodable
is less than 1.
Theorem 3 [n, ⌊Rn⌋, ⌊pn⌋, L]-list codes exist for suffi-







(H(p) + p log 3) . (2)
3Proof Let NE = |Epn| and Epn = {Ei}
NE
i=1. Two errors
Ei and Ej have the same syndrome iff E
†
iEj ∈ N(S). A
code fails to be L-list decodable only if there are L+1 in-
dependent errors E0, · · · , EL having the same syndrome.
Mathematically, E†iEj ∈ N(S) for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ L (or equiv-
alently, E†0Ej ∈ N(S) for 1 ≤ j ≤ L).





unique generating sets for stabi-
lizers with n−k generators (we omit the overall factors
±1, i of the Pauli matices). This is because S1 can be
chosen from the 22n−1 nontrivial Pauli matrices, and
S2 then has to be chosen from the set of 2
2n−1 Pauli
matrices commuting with S1 but outside of the mul-
tiplicative group generated by S1. Similarly, each Si
is chosen from the 22n−(i−1) Pauli matrices commuting
with S1, · · · , Si−1 but not from the multiplicative group
generated by them, and thus there are 22n−(i−1) − 2i−1





different generating sets, so we
also have found the total number of stabilizers of this
size.
Now, back to the arbitrary and fixed list E0, · · · , EL
of independent errors. It follows that {E†0Ej}j=1,··· ,L
are also independent. Thus there are 22n−L Pauli op-
erators commuting with them. Adapting the above





sets of generators for stabiliz-
ers with all n−k generators commuting with E†0Ej for
all j. Together with the unconstrained stabilizer count,
a randomly chosen S will give the same syndrome for








Applying the union bound for the choice of the L + 1
Ej ’s, the probability that a random [n, k] code is not L-






is less than NL+1E 2
−L(n−k). This is in turns less than 1 if
k ≤ n− (1+1/L) logNE . For every ǫ > 0, ∃nǫ s.t. when-












Theorem 3 tells us that for any rate R < 1−H(p)−p log 3,
there exist [n,Rn, pn, L]-list codes for large enough n and
L. (For example, let η = 1 − H(p) − p log 3 − R, and
choose ǫ = η/3, L ≥ (H(p)+ log 3)/ǫ, and n ≥ nǫ in
Thm. 3.) Using such a code, Cn,L, we can correct any


















†Bsi = I, and
where Gsf ∈ 〈P
s
l 〉.
We would now like to add a few more stabilizers to Cn,L
so that the receiver can reconstruct |ψ〉 unambiguously.
These additional stabilizers will be determined by a se-
cret key shared by the sender and receiver, and are thus
unknown to the adversary.
It will follow from proof of Thm. 4 below that
adding (1/ log(4/3))(2L + log(1/ǫ)) random stabilizers
to the code Cn,L would allow us to distinguish among
the {Gsf}
2L
j=1 possible errors in the list-decoded state
with a probability of 1 − ǫ. This would require
2n(2L+log(1/ǫ))/ log(4/3) bits of shared key.
A much smaller key can be used if ǫ-biased sets are
used to choose stabilizers pseudo-randomly. A sub-
set of {0, 1}m, denoted A, is said to be an ǫ-biased
set of length m if for each e ∈ {0, 1}m, roughly half
of the elements of A has odd/even parity with e:
|Pra∈A (e · a = 0)− Pra∈A (e · a = 1)| ≤ ǫ.
Let {Si}
n−k
i=1 be the stabilizers of C
n,L. We add K sta-
bilizers T1, · · · , TK . After each addition, we get a sub-
code of the previous code, and the number of encoded
qubits decreases. In particular, suppose j − 1 stabiliz-
ers have been added, resulting in a subcode Cn,Lj−1 with
k− j+1 encoded qubits. The next stabilizer Tj is chosen
according to a random element (uj,vj) of an ǫ-biased set





Xj−1 and Zj−1 are logical operations of C
n,L
j−1. The fol-
lowing theorem shows that using this procedure to add
K = O(L log 1/ǫ) stabilizers allows the receiver to re-
construct the encoded state with high probability (and
thus, decode with high fidelity). There are efficient con-
structions of ǫ-biased sets of length m with only O(m
2
ǫ )
elements [28, 29], so that the amount of secret key used





Theorem 4 Let Cn,L be an [n,Rn, pn, L]-list code of rate
R and let Cn,LK be the code obtained from C
n,L by pro-
gressively adding K = (1/ log(4/3))(2L + log(1/ǫ)) sta-
bilizers determined by ǫ-biased sets A1, · · · , AK (of de-
creasing length) as described above. By using a secret
key of fewer than O(K(log(n
2
ǫ ))) bits to select C
n,L
K ,
nR − K = n(R − o(n)) qubits can be sent over N advp,n
with fidelity at least 1− ǫ for all ǫ < 1/2.
Proof Since we use an [n,Rn, pn, L]-list code, the ad-
versary’s power is reduced to choosing the probability
distribution for s, and the corresponding superposition




l 〉 of error operations. So, if for
all syndromes of the list code, the probability (over the
choice of T1, · · · , TK) that there is a pair of list elements
that have the same commutation relations with the Tj
stabilizers is less than ǫ, the fidelity of the decoded state
4with the original will be at least 1− ǫ.
Let f1,2 be fixed and define the events Mj as
{ω(Gsf1 , Tj) = ω(G
s
f2











j=1 Pr (Mj |Mj−1 . . .M1). Since
each Tj is chosen using an ǫ-biased string of encoded
operations X¯j−1 and Z¯j−1 of the code C
n,L
j−1, we have
Pr (Mj |Mj−1 . . .M1) ≤
1+ǫ










. By a union bound over
the choice of f1,2, the probability of any pair f, f
′ hav-







By choosing K = (1/ log(4/3))(2L + log(1/ǫ)) we make
this failure probability less than ǫ for any ǫ < 1/2 so that
with probability at least 1− ǫ, Gsf can be unambiguously
identified and the state reconstructed. The output state
is thus of the form (1−ǫ)|ψ〉〈ψ|+ǫϕ for some state ϕ. ⊓⊔
DISCUSSION
We have introduced the adversarial quantum channel and
shown that by using a logarithmic length secret key it is
possible to communicate over this channel with a rate
of 1−H(p)−p log 3. This is much higher than would be
naively expected based on existing QECCs, and is quite
close to what is known to be possible using n independent
depolarizing channels with error probability p.
Our construction involves using quantum list codes,
which we defined and showed to exist with favorable pa-
rameters. We expect quantum list codes to be useful in
other contexts.
The scenario considered in this paper and the spirit of
our protocols are closely related to those of [30]. Com-
paring their result with ours points to interesting open
questions to consider. Reference [30] constructed approx-
imate quantum error correcting codes of length n capable
of correcting up to (n − 1)/2 errors with high probabil-
ity (compared to at most n/4 correctable errors for an
exact code). Thus, the fraction of errors that can be tol-
erated in [30] approaches 1/2 as n gets large, which is
much higher than in our current scheme. Furthermore,
unlike our scheme, no secret key is required. Instead, ran-
domizing parameters are sent as part of the message via
carefully constructed secret sharing schemes. However,
the alphabet size of the codes in [30] grows as a function
of both the blocklength and the code’s accuracy which
severely limits the transmission rate. Also, when their
large dimensional channel is viewed as a block of qubit
channels, the adversary considered in [30] is much more
restricted than ours, being limited to the corruption of
continuous blocks of qubits.
It is an interesting question whether there are qubit ap-
proximate QECCs which achieve the rates of our codes
but don’t require the use of a secret key, or, less ambi-
tiously, require only a key of constant size. More gener-
ally, the tradeoff between distance, rate, and key required
remains to be studied.
As a side remark, the secret key is used in our scheme as
a randomizing parameter that is unaccessible to the ad-
versary. Since the adversary must corrupt the transmit-
ted state before it is received by Bob, if Bob is allowed to
send a “receipt” of the quantum states to Alice, Alice can
simply disclose the random code afterwards and no key is
required. In other words, one bit of back communication
together with logarithmic forward classical communica-
tion (all authenticated) can be used to replace the key
requirement.
Our result also finds application to a different problem
– entanglement distillation with bounded weight errors.
In this problem, a state is already distributed between
Alice and Bob, so that the adversary has already acted
and randomizing parameters can be sent in public with-
out a “receipt”. In [31], it was shown that n noisy EPR
pairs with errors of weight up to pn could be purified to
n(1−H(p)− p log 3) perfect EPR pairs using a two-way
distillation procedure. Our construction allows us to dis-
till high fidelity EPR pairs at the same rate using only
forward classical communication. In fact, the authors
of [31] speculated that it would be possible to reduce
the computational complexity of their protocols by using
quantum list codes – almost exactly the approach taken
here, though in our case with an eye towards reducing the
communication required. The question of efficent encod-
ing and decoding via list codes has not yet been resolved.
There remain several potentially fruitful avenues of in-
quiry about adversarial quantum channels. The most
obvious question we have left unanswered regards the ca-
pacity of N advp,n assisted by a negligible length secret key.
It seems quite likely that this is equal to the capacity of
the depolarizing channel with error rate p, which would
be in analogy with the classical result of [17]. It may
also be interesting to consider how restricting the com-
putational power of our adversary affects the channel’s
capacity, which is another topic we will leave to future
work.
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